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I first met Elinor Ostrom in the early 1970s.  I was an assistant professor at Washington 
University, St. Louis, and she was a recently tenured associate professor at Indiana University 
who  traveled  to  St.  Louis  from  Bloomington  on  a  regular  basis  to  ride  around  dicey  urban 
neighborhoods in police cruisers.  Her research focused on metropolitan governance with special 
emphasis on the delivery of urban services of which police protection was a prime example.  She 
was a member of the recently founded Public Choice Society (indeed, her spouse Vincent was a 
founding member) and was an adherent of the rational choice approach to social phenomena that 
later came to be identified under the banners of the Rochester School, the Virginia School, and 
the Bloomington School.  But Elinor Ostrom was an uncommon scholar, and this shall be the 
theme of my brief contribution to this collection. 
According to conventional categories,  Lin  was a student of public administration.  Her 
studies of urban services comfortably fit into the scope of this hoary field of learning.  Her 
earliest publications, going back more than forty years, were mainly aimed at this community of 
scholars.    But  traditional  public  administration,  perhaps  because  of  her  early  exposure  to 
theoretical arguments in general and analytical theories in particular, was not for her.  The first 
sense, then, in which Lin was an uncommon scholar was in her intuitive sense of the need for 
intellectual arbitrage – between traditional public administration and analytical theories that put 
the understanding of human motivations on a firm footing. 
A  second  sense  in  which  Lin  was  uncommon  in  approach,  indeed  prescient,  was  (and 
continues to be) her inclination to get into the field.  Riding around in those police cruisers in St. 
Louis and other metropolitan areas provided Lin with a fine-grained empirical sense of the micro-
structure of public bureaucracies.  They are not abstract, not undifferentiated, not homogenous, 
and not simple.  No organizational flow-chart can adequately capture the nuances or realities of a 
real bureaucracy.  The distance between the cop on the beat or in the patrol car at the base and the 
police commissioner at the apex – spatial, intellectual, informational – is vast, putting a premium 
on the capacity of a bureau to manage itself, to incentivize its participants, and to transmit and 
evaluate information, all of which are necessary for adequate, if not high, performance.  Lin 
unpacked the bureaucracies found in public administration texts into essential components by 
experiencing them first-hand in the field, something she was to repeat throughout her career, most especially  in  her  path-breaking  analyses  of  common-pool  resources.    She  was  to  public 
administration what Richard Fenno was to the U.S. Congress – a political anthropologist studying 
the natives in their own habitats.  With the exception of Fenno and a few others, Lin was original 
in the American politics context in engaging in “soaking and poking” field work.   
A third sense in which Lin Ostrom proved uncommon was not only in moving from theory 
to practice, as noted above, but also among empirical strategies.  She was comfortable in the field, 
in the laboratory, doing statistical analysis, conducting meta-analysis of existing empirical work.  
Her research-methods quiver was full and she used every arrow in it. 
The final sense that I will discuss in which Lin is uncommon, perhaps the most significant 
sense, is her capacity to tolerate complexity and to elaborate its consequences.  As she observed 
in her Nobel address, “Complexity is not the same as chaos.”
1  This theme reverberates in all her 
work  over  nearly  half  a  century.    But  it  is  especially  penetrating  in  the  questions  that  have 
preoccupied her these last two decades, namely: Are rational individuals hopelessly trapped in 
dilemmas?  Are groups stuck overgrazing common pastures, overexploiting their forests, fisheries, 
and water supplies, overpolluting their rivers, lakes, oceans, and atmosphere?  In short, are we 
doomed to equilibrium traps, to inefficient Nash equilibria?  Her optimistic responses to these 
questions are not those of a Pollyanna, but rather are based on her experiences in the field and the 
laboratory and rooted in analysis.  She finds strong effects on overcoming equilibrium traps in 
communities in which there is the self-governing authority to form agreements and create (and 
amend) practices endogenously, the capacity to monitor these, the ability to enforce them and/or 
the  opportunity  for  exit,  and  the  development  of  trust.    While  very  small  groups  allow  for 
considerable autonomy and very large ones are able to exploit economies of scope and scale, at 
least in principle, it is small to medium-sized associations that optimize between autonomy and 
scope  and  scale  on  the  one  hand  and  the  ability  to  foster  institutions  that  allow  for  trust, 
monitoring, and enforcement on the other.  (It was, as Lin discovered in her earliest work, the 
medium-sized  communities,  not  the s m a l l  t o w n s  o r  l a r g e  c i t i e s ,  w h o s e  p o l i c i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  
performed best.)  These arrangements are often messy, complex, the very opposite of impersonal 
or stream-lined. 
In summarizing Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to social science and public policy, I would 
like to emphasize something I associate with the game theory revolution in economics in the late 
1970s.  When von Neumann and Morgenstern first popularized game theory for social scientists 
                                                 
1 Her twenty-eight minute address is a treat to which I commend the reader.  It may be found at: 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html. in the 1940s, economists initially thought they had died and gone to heaven.  (The reviews of this 
work in economics journals at the time suggested as much.)  Within a very few years, however, 
the profession had turned its theoretical attention elsewhere, with general equilibrium replacing 
game theory as the theoretical approach of choice.  Game theorists during the 1950s and 1960s, 
mainly cooperative game theorists, grew defensive, felt misunderstood, and essentially pulled 
their wagons into a circle; they became a self-contained and self-absorbed community, confident 
in its own research agenda and relatively thin-skinned when it came to criticism.  Critics even 
from within the fold, like Thomas Schelling, were often treated as traitors, not innovators. 
I am not sure what happened in the mid- to late 1970s aside from the growing emphasis on 
non-cooperative approaches to games – generational change rather than learning is my guess – 
but I believe the game-theoretic revolution in economics that began to take hold at that time 
benefited from the fact that game theorists took their critics seriously rather than dismissively, 
grew much more experimental and open-minded, and regarded new ideas as challenges worthy of 
consideration rather than as the views of uninformed detractors.  In recent times there has been a 
touch of defensiveness among practitioners of a mature rational choice theory in political science 
(in which I include myself) reminiscent of the cooperative game theorists of the 1950s:  confident 
in their research agenda, like those cooperative game theorists, and just as thin-skinned when it 
came to criticism.  Lin Ostrom’s research, emphasizing governance, institutions, complexity, and 
empirical context, reflects an experimental open-mindedness to observed regularities, even when 
they seemed inconsistent with “the canon,” and a willingness to incorporate rather than dismiss 
challenges.  She is not alone in this, of course, but her modus operandi has made rationality-based 
approaches more inclusive and positioned it more closely to mainstream political science.  It has 
enriched our theories and, at the same time, enriched political science as well. 